BUTLER v. M., S., & L. RAILWAY CO.
Townsend v. N. Y. C., etc. R. (1874),
56 N. Y. 295; P. F. IV. - C.R.v.
Slusser (1869), 19 Ohio St. 157.
Where the plaintiff was delayed,
but not otherwise damaged, $400 has
not been held excessive: T. IV. 4- IV.
R. v. McDonough (1876), 53 Ind. 289.
In the same State $50U has been allowed for one day's delay: P. C. 6- St.
L. R. v. Heanigh (1872), 39 Ind.
509 ; and $600, where a passenger was
put off late at night, several miles
from a station, and seven miles from
his destination: L. E. 4- TV. R. v.
Fix (1882), 88 Id. 381.
Where a conductor wrongly supposed that a child, travelling on a half
ticket, was of age to pay full fare, and
insisted on ejecting him unless full
fare were paid, and the mother left
the train also, though told that her
ticket was perfectly good, she was
held entitled to recover damages on
her own account as well as on that of
the child: Gibson v. E. T. V. 4- G. R.,
U. S. C. Ct., E. Dist. Tenn. (1887),
30 Fed. Rep. 904.
If a passenger has the money to pay
his fare, his obstinate refusal to do so,
and insisting on being ejected, will
prevent a recovery on account of injury to his feelings: Hall v. M. 4-c.
R., supra; Gibson v. E. T. V. 4-. G.
R., supra. And if the passenger
resist, he cannot recover for bodily
injuries received, unless wantonly
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inflicted : LUllis v. St. L. K. Cy.
4- N. R., supra. If the conductor be
honestly mistaken, and no excessive
force be used, only actual damages
are, as a general rule, recoverable:
Graha v. Pac. R. (1877), 66 Mo. 536.
But where the expulsion was from a
horse-car, the passenger was allowed
to recover for the injury to his feelings
also, though not exemplary damages:
Hamilton v. Third Ave. Rt. Co. (1873),
53 N. Y. 25.
If the act of the conductor be wanton, reckless, and oppressive, exemplary damages may be recovered:
E'ans v. St. L. L H. 4" S. R. (1882),
11 Mo. App. 463; as where the plaintiff was put off at an unseasonable
hour in the morning at a place where
he suffered from exposure to the
weather: Hall v. S. C. R., S. Ct. S.
C., March 20, 1888. In L. S. 6- M. S.
R. v. Rosenzweig (1886), 113 Pa. 519,
where the conductor showed utter disregard of the passenger's safety, and
the latter was very severely injured,
a verdict for $48,750 was sustained.
In Phila. Traction Co. v. Orbann,
(1888), 119 Pa. 37; s. c. 27 AmBuICAm
LAw RBGisTE, 338, the rule followed
ih the last-cited case is recognized as
in accordance with the preponderance
of authority, although its propriety is
doubted.
CHAS. CHAUNCEY BINNEY.
Philadelphia.
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Supreme Court of Alabama.
CHERRY ET AL. v. HERRING.
Where a deed was handed by the grantor to the grantee and both parties
immediately went to the adjacent office of H. and the deed was there delivered
to H. to hold until a sum of money should be paid, and H. then endorsed on
the deed that it was an escrow, to be held until the payment, but the money
was never paid and the deed not found; there was no delivery, and the deed
did not become an executed conveyance.
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from the Circuit Court of Lee County.
The plaintiffs were non-suited in the Court below, in an action for the recovery of a tract of land, after the Court had
refused to admit evidence that the common grantor, Thomas
J. Stephens, had not delivered the deed to the defendant, but
had deposited it as an escrow under the circumstances mentioned in the opinion (infra).
APPEAL

A. and R. B. Barnes and George P. Harrison, Jr., for appellants.
J. M. Chilton, for appellee.
STONE, C. J., February 1, 1888. We do not question the
doctrine, so firmly established, that a deed cannot be delivered
to the grantee, to be held by him as an escrow, and to become valid and binding as a conveyance, only on the happening of an event to transpire afterwards: Williams v.Higgins,
(1881), 69 Ala. 517; 1 Dev. Deeds, § 814; 3 Wash. Real
Prop. (5th ed.), 817; Ins. Co. v. McMillan (1856), 29 Ala.
147; Simonton's -Estate (1835), 4 Watts (Pa.), 180. It is certainly true that a paper, on its face a deed, though formally
executed in all other respects, is nevertheless inoperative as a
deed, if there has been no delivery to the grantee. Delivery,
however, need not be positively proved. It is often inferred
from circumstances, not the least frequent of which in its occurrence is the possession of the deed by the grantee. Many
other acts or facts justify the presumption of delivery, but
we need not enumerate them: 8 Brick. Dig. 298, §§ 25-27;
1 Dev. Deeds, §§ 260 et seq. ; 1 Brick. Dig. 53; 3 Wash.
Real Prop. (5th ed.), 804. When the testimony is indeterminate, the inquiry of delivery vel non is one of intention, to
be determined by the jury: Alexander v. Alexander (1882)
71 Ala. 295 ; Murray v. Stair (1828), 2 B. & C. 82; 1 P ,.
Deeds, §§ 262-263. The fact that the grantee acquire -irat
some time had the possession of the deed, unexplainedi, raises
the presumption that it was delivered to him by the grantor,
and that it thereby became operative as a conveyance. We
have shown above that this presumption cannot be overturned
by proving that it was delivered to him as an escrow, to become a conveyance on the happening of some future event.
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The reason assigned for this ruling is, that, when a grantor
delivers to a grantee a deed fbrmally executed in all other
respects, each of the two parties has then performed every
act which he proposes to do, or can do, in reference to the
execution of the paper; and these acts, without more, raise
the legal presumption that the conveyance is fully executed.
Doing, or not doing, the outside thing upon which the effect
of delivery, as a complete execution of the deed, is to depend,
is not a proposition to do anything further with the deed.
The naked offer is to prove a contemporaneous oral agreement that, unless some outside collateral, unwritten stipulation is complied with by the grantee, then this possession
shall, ipso facto, be treated as no proof of delivery, and the instrument as no deed. To allow this, would be to permit the
legal effect of a deed, complete to all outside appearances, to
be varied, and in many instances defeated, by oral proof of an
agreement not embraced in the writing.
In the case we have in hand, the testimony offered would
have tended to show that the deed was handed to Herring,
the purchaser, at a point near Hooper's office, and the two
parties then went in company to Hooper and delivered the
deed to him; that Hooper indorsed on the deed that it was
delivered to him as an escrow, to be delivered to Herring
when $125 should be paid by Herring to or for Stephens;
and that the money was never paid, and the deed was never
afterwards in the hands of Herring. Hooper is dead and the
deed was not produced. It has probably been destroyed or
lost. This testimony, if received, would have tended to show
the foregoing state of facts; that the delivery to Hooper was
made by the consent of both parties, with the agreement and
understanding which was expressed in his indorsement, and
that the delivery of the deed by Stephens to Herring, if not
made that the latter might inspect it, was at most made with
the understanding that it should be carried to Hooper, and
placed with him as an escrow.
We need not, and do not decide, what would be our ruling
if Herring had kept the deed, and had never delivered it to
Hooper. That question is not before us.
We do hold, however, that the testimony offered should
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have been received; and if it proves that the delivery and deposit with Hooper were made as offered to be shown, and with
the agreement and understanding that Hooper should hold
the deed as an escrow, then the handing of the deed by
Stephens to Herring was not a delivery, and the deed did not
thereby become an executed conveyance. Left, as the deed
was, with Hooper, Herring could not have obtained possession
of it until some other act was done, namely, a delivery of it
by Hooper. This presents all the elements of an escrow, not
in Herring's possession, but in Hooper's. In Gilbert v. Ins.
Co. (1840), 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 43, it was ruled that "leaving a
deed in the hands of the grantee, to be by him transmitted to
a third person, to hold in escrow until the happening of a certain event, is not a delivery to the grantee, so as to vest title
in him ;" s. c. and note, 35 Am. Dec. 543. The same doctrine is declared inFairbanks v. Xetcalf (1811), 8 Mass. 230,
and ih Brown v. Reynolds (1858), 5 Sneed (Tenn.), 639. This
doctrine is asserted without disapprobation in Dev. Deeds,
§ 317 ; and in § 271, the same author says: "A delivery of
a deed for inspection,or a delivery to the grantee or his agent,
to be held while the grantee has under consideration the proposition whether he shall accept it or not, is not a valid delivery." And 3 Wash. Real Prop. (5th ed.) 317, says: "A deed
can never be an escrow if delivered to the grantee himself,
unless for the express purpose of being handed to another
person." These principles we consider sound and conservative, and we adopt them. The rulings of the Circuit Court
are in conflict with our views.
Reversed, nonsuit set aside, and cause remanded.
§ 1. What maybe delhered in Escrow.
Any kind of an instrument, having
the essentials of a contract, may be
delivered in escrow. The most familiar
instance is that of an ordinary deed,
but other instruments in escrow have
been the subject of judicial decision,
such as a sheriff's deed: Jackson v.
Catlin (1807), 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 248 ; a
promissory note: Conch v. Meeker
(1817), 2 Conn. 302 ; Fo v. Blackstone

(1863), 31 Ill.
538; Bellows v. Folsom
(1866), 4 Robt. (N. Y.) 43; Perry v.
Patterson (1844), 5 Humph. (Tenn.)
133 ; a bend: Madison, etc. Plank Road
Co. v. Stevens (1857), 10 Ind. 1; a
stock subscription : Wright v. Shelby
R. B. Co. (1855), 16 B. Mon. (Ky.)
4; Case Wagon Co. v. Wolfenden (1885),
63 Wis. 185; a composition deed:
Johnson v. Baker (1821), 4 B. & Ald.
440; and any instrument, even though
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not under seal: Seymour v. Cowing
(1864), 4 Abb. (N. Y.) App. 200 ; a
mortgage: Chipman v. Tucker (1875),
38 Wis. 43; Schmidt v. Deegan, 69
Wis. 300.
§ 2. Definition. Etymologically, the
word. "escrow" means a "scroll."
An old definition, and one much
quoted, is as follows: "The delivery
of a deed as an escrow is said to be,
where one doth make and seal a deed
and deliver it unto a stranger until
certain conditions be performed, and
then to be delivered to him to whom
the deed is made, to take effect as his
deed. And so a man may deliver a
deed, and such a delivery is good.
But in this case two cautions must
be heeded: first,* that the form of
words used in the delivery of a deed
in this manner, be apt and proper;
second, that the deed be delivered to
one that is a stranger to it, and not to
the party himself to whom it is
made :" Sheppard's Touchstone, 58.
This definition, as we shall elsewhere see, is not strictly correct, so
far as it requires the delivery to be to
a stranger: Watkins v. Nash (1875), L.
R. 20 Eq. 262. A modern definition
is that "an escrow is a deed delivered to a third person, upon a future
condition to be performed by either
party. It must be delivered to a
stranger, and the conditions mentioned :" Raymond v. Smith (1825), 5
Conn. 555. As a description of an
escrow, we have the following: "Itis
essential to an escrow that it be delivered to a third person to be by him
delivered to the obligee or grantee,
upon the happening of some event or
the performance of some condition,
from which time it becomes an absolute deed:" James v. Vanderhuyden
(1829), 1 Paige, 387. Hence, where
a deed was executed by H. and wife,
and delivered as an escrow to M., who
tendered it to the grantee, and, on

refusal by the grantee to accept it, M.
returned it to H., this did not constitute H. an agent for his wife, to hold
the deed as an escrow, and, atter her
death, to make a valid delivery to the
grantee. Executors of Shoenberger v.
Hackman (1860), 37 Pa. 87.
§ 3. Must be a completed Instrument.
It will be observed that the instrument put in escrow must be a completed one ; that is, nothing so far
remains to be done, touching the perfecting of the instrument, except delivery to the grantee or obligee. If it
is a deed, it must be signed by the
grantor, the grantee named, and the
land intended to be conveyed, described; it must be as complete in
manual execution as if it were to be
placed in the hands of the grantee
and title pass at once. If anything
in this respect remains to be done, it is
not a valid escrow. Not only this,
but, back of the deed, must be a contract between the parties to it, definitely assented to by both of them,
and requisite in all its parts to cover
all that is essential to secure a conveyance of the land. Unless there has
been a meeting of the minds sufficient
for a contract of conveyance, there
cannot be a deed put in escrow; for if
it is attempted, it will be the act of
one only: Fitch v. Bunch (1866), 30
Cal. 208.
§ 4. To whom delivered. It is elementary to say that a delivery of a
deed or written contract is essential th
its validity. This is true of an instrument delivered in escrow. But
in all such instances of an escrow,
the delivery must be to a person not a
party to the instrument, a third person or stranger; as we have seen it
stated, in the case of a deed, to
some one else than the grantor or
grantee. In fact, it may be broadly
stated that there cannot be a delivery,
in case of a deed, to the grantee, and
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in case of a note, to the payee:
McCannv. Atherton (1883), 106 111. 31;
Stevenson v. Cropnell (1885), 114 Id.
19; Stewart v. Anderson (1877), 59
Ind. 375; Deardorfv.Foresinon(1865),
24 Id. 481; Madison P. R. Co. v. Stevens, supra; Roche v. Roanoke Seminary
(1877), 56 Ind. 198; Wright v. Shelby
R. R. Co., supra; Jackson dem. Russell
v. Rowland (1831), 6 Wend. (N. Y.)
666 ; Gilbert v. North American FireIns.
Co., supra; Seymour v. Cowing, supra;
Beers v. Beers (1876), 22 Mich. 42;
Metcalfv. Van Brunt (1862), 37 Barb.
(N.Y.) 621;Ordinaryof N. J.v. Thatcher
(1879), 41 N. J. L. 403; Foley v. Cowgill (1838), 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 18; State v.
Chrisman (1850), 2 Ind. 126 ; Madison,
etc. PlankRoad Co. v. Stevens (1855), 6
Id. 379; Stephens v.Buffalo,etc.R. R. Co.
(1855), 20 Barb. (N.Y.) 332; Miller v.
1'etcher (1876), 27 Grat. (Va.) 403.
The last citation has an excellent discussion of old and modern cases and
authorities. This is true, however,
only of those instruments in which the
conditional character of the instrument is not expressed in writing upon
the face thereof; and only relates to
those instruments where the condition
rests in parol or an outside instrument: McCann v. Atherton, supra;
Wendlingerv. Smith (1881), 75 Va. 309;
Hicks v. Goode (1842), 12 Leigh (Va.),
479. An instrument in which the
condition is not expressed therein, if
delivered to the obligee, becomes operative at once, even though contrary
to the intention of the parties ihereto: Foley v. Cowgill, supra; Bramon v.
Bingham (1863), 26 N. Y. 483;
Worrell v. Munn (1851), 5 Id. 229:
"A deed can only be delivered in
escrow to a third person. If it be
intended that it shall not take effect
until some subsequent condition shall
be performed, or some subsequent
event shall happen, such conditions
must be inserted in the deeditself, or

else it must not be delivered to the
grantee. Whether a deed has been
delivered or not is a question of fact,
upon which, from the very nature of
the case, parol evidence is admissible.
But whether a deed, when delivered,
shall take effect absolutely, or only
upon the performance of some condition not expressed therein, cannot be
determined by parol evidence. To
allow a deed, absolute upon its face,
to be avoided by such evidence, would
be a dangerous violation of a cardinal
rule of evidence. The deed in this
case being absolute upon its face, and
having been delivered to the grantee
himself, took effect at once. It could
not have been delivered to take effect
upon the happening of a future contingency, for this would be inconsistent with the terms of the instrument itself. Without regard, therefore, to any understanding which may
have existed between the parties at
the time the deed was delivered, it
must be held to be an absolute conveyance, operative from that time:"
Lawton'v. Sager (1851), 11 Barb. (N.
Y.) 349.
§ 5. Rule modified. This is the rule
laid down in the old cases (and in
Touchstone, as we have seen) : Thoro,,ghgood's Case, Hil. 9 Jac. 1, 9 Co. R.
137; Whyddon's Case, Trin. 38 Eliz.,
Cro. Eliz. 520: Holford v. Parker
(circa 1620), Hob. 246, and other respectable authorities : Hicks v. Goode,
supra; and a plea setting up a conditional delivery is bad: Hawksland v.
Gatchell, Easter T. 42 Eliz., Cro. Eliz.
835; Williams v. Green, Trin. T. 43
Eliz. Id. 884; Foley v. COnwgill, supra;
Pyn v. Campbell (1856), 25 L. J.Q.
B. 279. But this rule has been somewhat modified by a recent case in England. In the case referred to, a reconveyance was executed by one of
two trustee mortgagees expressly as
an escrow, conditioned on payment of
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the mortgage debt, and was left by
him with his co-trustee. The co-trustee afterwards also executed the reconveyance expressly as an escrow
"upon the faith of an undertaking
that the business should be forthwith
settled," and handed the re-conveyance to the solicitor of the mortgagor.
This was held to be a good delivery
as an escrow, and the Vice-Chancellor said, as to the execution, by the
first co-trustee : "It is said that the
deed thus executed could not be called
an escrow, because it was not delivered to a stranger, and that is, no
doubt, the way in which the rule is
stated in some of the text-books-Sheppard's Touchstone, for instance;
but when those authorities are examined, it will be found that it is not
merely a technical question, as to
whtther or not the deed is delivered
into the hands of A. B., to be held
conditionally; but, when a delivery
to a stranger is spoken of, what is
meant is a delivery of a character
negativing its being a delivery to the
grantee or to the party who is to have
the benefit of the instrument. We
cannot deliver the deed to the grantee
himself, it is said, because that would
be inconsistent with its preserving the
character of an escrow. But if, upon
the whole of the transaction, it be
clear that the delivery was not intended to be a delivery to the grantee
at that time, but that it was to be
something different, then you must
not give effect to the delivery as being
a complete delivery, that not being
the intent of the persons who executed
the instrument." As to the execution
by the second co-trustee, the ViceChancellor said he saw no difficulty in
holding that, if it were a delivery to
the solicitors acting for the mortgag:r, "it was a delivery to him as
an agent for all parties for the purpose
of that delivery:" Watkins v. Nash,

supra. Here, it will be observed, was
a delivery to the solicitor acting for
the grantee alone, and it was held a
good escrow. This is certainly a modification of the doctrine of the old authorities ; and goes further than a less
recent case, that a deed might be delivered as an escrow to a solicitor acting
for all the parties to it: Millership v.
Brookes (1860), 5 H. & N. 797.
§ 6. Delirery to Agent.-Since another may act for one in his stead, or
a man may perform an act by an
agent, a delivery to an agent authorized to receive the deed is a delivery
in law to the grantee himself, and it
cannot be made an escrow: Duncan v.
Pope (1872), 47 Ga. 445; Weir v.
Batdorf, Supreme Court, Neb. 1888;
Worrall v. Munn, supra; Stewart v.
Anderson, supra; Belleville, etc. Bank
v. Bornman, Supreme Court Ill 1886;
Madison, etc. PlankRoad Co. v. Stevens,
supra; Miller v. Fletcher, supra. So a
delivery to the grantor's agent will
not put the instrument in escrow:
Weir v. Batdorj; supra.
If the delivery is made to an officer
of a corporation, with the intention of
passing title, this is a delivery to the
corporation itself, if such corporation
is the grantee or obligee. But such
an officer may act as the agent of beth
parties, and receive the deed in escrow ; for there is no such personal
identity between a corporation and its
officers as will prevent a delivery to
them as an escrow: Southern Life Ins.,
etc. Co. v. Cole (1852), 4 Fla. 359;
Bank of Healdsburg v.Bailhache (1884),
65 Cal. 327. " It is said that delivery
to an officer or servant of a corporation is delivery to the corporation. To
this we assent, with the addition that
such delivery is for the use and benefit
of the corporation, and with intent to
pass an absolute property or interest
in the deed delivered; and the rule
would be the same, if the delivery
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should be made to a mere stranger.
We do not think that there is such a
personal identity between the corporation and its officers that a deed may
not be placed in the bands of the latter as an escrow until the performance
of some condition," etc. : Southern
Life Ins., etc. Co. v. Cole, supra. So
where one may act as the agent of
both parties, he may hold the deed in
escrow; but an absolute delivery to an
officer of a corporation cannot be afterwards modified so as to put the instrument in escrow ; the effect of the act
can never be changed: Cincinnati,
(1862), 13 Ohio
etc. R. R. Co. v. liff"
St. 235. A deed may be delivered to
arbitrators for their disposal, as they
shall award the title: Peck v. Goodwin
(1786), Kirby (Conn.), 64.
§ 7. Transmission to Holder by
Grantee.-The question arises, can the
grantee, or obligee, act as an agent to
carry or transmit the deed to the person who is to hold it in escrow ? This
has been answered in the affirmative:
Gilbertv. North American, etc. Ins. Co.,
supra. "The deed, as well as the
mortgage, was left in the hands of
Nottingham (the grantee), to be forwarded to Babcock, the depositary. It
was not put into the hands of the
grantee to keep, but merely as a mode
of transmission to Babcock, as was
well said by the Judge on the trial.
There was neither any formal delivery, nor any intent that the grantee
should take it as the deed of the
grantor. Nottingham received it, not
as grantee, but as the agent of the
grantor for a special purpose ; and I
see no good reason why he could not
execute that trust as well as a stranger. He did execute it with fidelity,
and the deed still remains with the
depositary agreed on by the parties :"
Id. Here it will be observed that the
deed had reached the hands of the
depositary, when the point was raised.

Suppose the grantee had retained the
deed, denying the condition, and
claiming an absolute delivery, what
then ? In such an event the delivery
would be held to be absolute, and
parol evidence not admitted to show
the conditional delivery: Bramon v.
Bingham, supra; Jackson v. Sheldon
(1843), 22 Me. 569 ; Brown v. Reynolds,
supra; Simonton's Est., supra; 11urray
v. Stair, supra; Den v. Partee, 2 Dev.
& Bat. (N. C.) 530; Wright v. Shelby
R. R., supra.
§ 8. Words of Delivery.-By some
of the old authorities the word "escrow" must be used to make the delivery a good one in escrow; such as
"I deliver this -deed in escrow upon
the condition," etc. But this rule
has long since been exploded : Nottebeck v. Wilks (1857), 4 Abb. Pr. (N.
Y.) 315; Gilbert v. North American,
etc. Ins. Co., supra. But the words
used and the intention of the parties
must show that it is a conditional delivery, such a condition as the law permits the parties to agree upon : Jackson
dem. Russell v. Rowland, supra. If
the grantor or obligor retain by
agreement control over the instrument, it is not an escrow; for the depositary is only the agent of the
grantor, and not of beth, as the law
requires: Loubat v. Kipp (1860), 9
Fla. 60; Arnold v. Patrick (1837), 6
Paige (N. Y.), 310; Carrick v. French
(1846), 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 459; Johnson v. Branch (1851), 11 Id. 521; Ordinaryof N. J. v. Thatcher, supra; Evans
v.Gibbs (1846),6 Humph. (Tenn.) 405;
Groves v. Tucker (1848), 18 Miss. 9.
"There was nothing agreed to be done
by or on the part of the grantee as
the condition upon the performance
of which the deed was to become
absolute, and to be delivered to
him by the third person. It is the
general rule that a deed delivered to
a third person is viewed as an escrow
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only in case it is agreed that the deed
is to be delivered to the grantee, upon
the performance by him of the stipalated condition: Fitch v. Bunch, supra.
See Clark v. Gifford (1833), 10 Wend.
(N. Y.) 310; White v. Bailey (1841),
14 Conn. 271; Curriev. Donald (1794),
2 Wash. (Va.) 58; Wlate v. Williams
(1836), 3 N. J. Eq. 376.
§ 9. Whether an Escrow or Present
Deed.-It is often difficult to determine whether a deed is delivered in
escrow or not. A modern authority,
recognizing this difficulty, sums up
what he considers the doctrine of the
cases on this point as follows: "If
the payment of money, or the performance of some other condition, is
the circumstance upon which the future delivery is to depend, the instrument is an escrow ; but where the
future delivery does not depend upon
the performance of any condition, but
it is deposited with a third person
merely to await the lapse of time or
the happening of some contingency,
it will be deemed the grantor's deed
presently :" Devlin on Deeds, § 319,
citing Hathaway v. Payne (1865), 34
N. Y. 92; Foster v. Mansfield (1841), 3
Met.(Mass.)412; Wheelwright v. Wheelwright (1807), 2 Mass. 447; and saying in a note, "but see Stone v. Duvall
(1875), 77 II. 475, where a deed of
this kind was considered rather to be
an escrow."
Commenting further
upon this subject, the same author
says: "This distinction is material,
because, if it be an escrow, no title
passes to the grantee until the second
delivery, while, if it be a present deed,
the title, upon the happening of the
contingency, or upon the lapse of the
specified time, passes by relation
from the time the instrument was
placed in the hands of the depositary
or trustee. As the intent of the
parties is the point to be ascertained,
each case must be decided upon its

own peculiar circumstances, upon the
language employed, the situation of
the parties, the object to be attained,
and such other facts as may throw
light upon the intention of the
parties :" § 320. In this he is clearly
sustained by a quotation from Hathaway v. Payne, supra. See O'Kelly v.
O'Kelly (1844), 8 Met. (Mass.) 436;
Murray v. Stair, supra; Shaw v. Hayward (1851), 7 Cush. (Mass.) 170;
Cook v. Brown (1857), 34 N. H. 460;
Hunter v. Hunter (1853), 17 Barb. (N.
Y.) 25; Goodell v. Rierce (1842), 2
Hill (N. Y.), 659; Tooley v. Dibble
(1842), 2 Id. 641; Ruggles v. Lawson
(1816), 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 285; Price
v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. B. Co. (1864),
34 Ill. 13.
§ 10. Grantor Retaining Control over
Instrument.-" An essential characteristic and indispensable feature of every delivery, whether absolute or conditional, is that there must be a
parting with the possession, and of the
power and control over the deed by
the grantor, for the benefit of the
grantee at the time of delivery:" .rutsman v. Baker (1872), 30 Wis. 644.
For if he retains any control over it,
it is not an escrow, notwithstanding
it has been delivered to a third person with instructions to deliver it to
the grantee or obligee upon the performance of some condition, or the
happening of some event: Campbell v.
Thomas (1877), 42 Wis. 437. In case
of a true delivery in escrow the
grantor has no control over the instrument delivered: Welborn v. Weaver
(1855), 17 Ga. 267.
§ 11. Gift.-In case of a gift, the
rule just referred to seems to be different. Thus, where a deed was placed
as an escrow in a third person's
hands, upon condition that it must
first be signed and acknowledged by
the grantor's wife, and not be delivered until the grantee executed a
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mortgage, as the grantor called it, securing to him and his wife a life estate
in the premises, and the custodian,
without authority, placed the deed on
record, after the grantor's death, it
not having been signed by the wife
nor any mortgage delivered, it was
held that the heirs of the grantee
could maintain an action to have it
set aside. "It was his (the grantor's)
privilege to judge for himself whether
the terms upon which he was willing
to deliver the deed to his property as
a donation had been performed. The
scrivener in whose custody the deed
was left, was not invested with any
discretion in regard to it. He had
no authority to deliver it until the
grantor was satisfied it should be.
Being a voluntary conveyance without consideration, the grantor was at
liberty at any time to withdraw the
deed from the possession of the custo-

dian, and the grantee could have no
just cause to complain. The grantor
was under no legal obligation to complete the donation :" Hoig v. Adrian
College (1876), 83 II. 267.
§ 12. Conditions Allowed.- I"The
condition may consist in the payment
of money as well as in the performance of any other act :" Jackson v.
Catlin, supra. It seems useless to multiply citations upon this point. Of
course no immoral or illegal condition
could be insisted upon; and if the
performance of such an act were the
condition of the escrow, it would be
an absolute delivery, perhaps, the
condition being void.
§ 13. Party in whom title isvested.While the deed is held in escrow, and
before performance of the condition, or
happening of the event, the title to the
land remains in the grantor: Harkreader v. Clayton (1879), 56 Miss.
383; Patrick v. McCormick (1880), 10
Neb. 1; see Baile , v. Crim (1879), 9
Biss. 95.

§ 14. Judgment against Grantor.The title remaining in the grantor, a
judgment taken against him before
the second delivery, is a lien upon the
land: Jackson dem. Russell v. Rowland,
supra. But if necessary to protect intervening rights of the grantee, it will
be held that the deed took effect at the
first delivery: Shirley v. AM~res (1846),
14 Ohio, 307; Block v. Hoyt (1877),
33 Ohio St., 212; Price v. Pittsburgh,
etc. R. R. Co., supra.
§ 15. When title passes.-The title to
the real estate only passes upon the
happening of the event or the performance of the conditions upon
which it was delivered: Conch v.
Meeker, supra; Daggett v. Daggett
(1887), 143 Mass. 516; County of Calhoun v. American Emigrant Co. (1876),
93 U. S. 124; Jackson dem. Russell v.
Rowland, supra. No formal delivery
by the agent holding the deed to
the grantee is necessary: Conch v.
Meeker, supra. "The title only passes
on performance of the condition or the
happening of the event, except in certain cases, where, by fiction of law,
the writing is allowed to take effect
from the first delivery :" Tutsman v.
Baker, supra.
§ 16. Delivery enforced.-A Court of
Equity, on the performance of the condition or happening of the event, will
compel a delivery of the deed by the
depositary of the grantee: Stanton v.
Miller (1873), 65 Barb. (N. Y.) 58;
Schmidt v. Deegan, supra. See Shirley
v. Ayres, supra; Knopf v. Hansen
(1887), 37 Minn. 215.
This is
true of the grantor, if he wrongfully
obtains possession of the deed thereafter: Regan v. Howe (1876), 121
Mass. 424. The destruction of the
deed by the grantor does not prevent
the title vesting in the grantee: Id.
The Supreme Court of Kansas, on
November 10, 1888, declared, in deciding the case of Hughes v. Thistle-
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wood, which was an action to compel
the delivery of a deed of the homestead, "that the wife, by intrusting
the delivery of the deed to her husband
after its due execution, authorized
him to afrange the details of receiving payment and consummating the
delivery; that the placing of the deed
in escrow until the draft was converted into money was a step in the
delivery of the deed, and the signature of the wife to the stipulation respecting the same was unnecessary to
a conveyance of the property; and,
further, that when the condition of
deposit was accomplished it was the
duty of S. to deliver the deed, and the
attempted detention of the same would
not prevent it from taking effect."
The case was this: A tract of land,
occupied by H. and his family as a
homestead, was sold to T., and H. and
his wife executed a deed, which H.
presented to T. T. drew a draft on
New York for the purchase-money,
and the draft and deed were placed in
the hands of S. as a depositary, under
a stipulation that he should deliver
the deed when the draft was collected,
and that H. should furnish an abstract showing good title to the property sold in him. The stipulation was
signed by H. and T., but not by the
wife of H. The money was collected
on the draft in due course of mail, and
within about eight days; and after some
further delay in an attempt to rectify
defects in the title disclosed by the
abstract, T. demanded the deed, but
in the mean time H. had notified S.
not to deliver the same.
§ 17. Relationback to first Delivery.There are instances in which it will
be held that a deed in escrow takes
effect, by relation, from the time of its
first delivery, in order to prevent a
failure of justice, or the intentions of
the parties. "This relation back to
the first delivery is permitted, how-

ever, only in cases of necessity and
where no injustice will be done, to
avoid injury to the operation of the
deed from events happening between
the first and second delivery; as, if
the grantor, being afene sole, should
marry, or whether a feme sole or not,
should die or be attainted after the
first and before the second delivery,
the deed will be considered as taking
effect from the first delivery, in order
to accomplish the intent of the
grantor, which would otherwise be defeated by the intervening incapacity.
But subject only to this fiction of
relation in cases like those above
supposed, and others of the kind,
which is only allowed to prevail in
furtherance of justice and where no
injury will arise to the rights of third
persons, the instrument has no effect
as a deed, and no title passes, until
the second delivery; and it has accordingly been held, that if, in the
mean time, the estate should be levied
upon by a creditor of the grantor, he
would hold by virtue of such levy, in
preference to the grantee in the deed :"
Prutsmnanv. Baker, supra. The better
doctrine seems to be that the title
passes at the time performance is made
or the contingent event happens: 1
Devlin on Deeds, § 331. So far as
the capacity of the grantor is concerned, it takes effect from the first
delivery: 2 Wharton on Cont. § 679.
Husband and wife executed a deed
and placed it in escrow until the purchase-money was paid. Before that
event, the wife died and the husband
re-married. The claim of the second
wife to dower, at his death, was denied, being taken away by relation of
the deed back to the time of its deliveryin escrow : Vorheisv. Ketch (18S1),
8 Phila. (Pa.) 554. Toalikepoint, see
Beekman v. Frost (1820), 18. Johns.
(N. Y.) 544; s. c.1 Johns. Ch. 297;
544.
Stanley v. Valentine (1875), 79 Ill.
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§ 18. Death of Grantor before second
Delicery.-If the grantor die while the
deed is in escrow, before the performance of the condition or the happening
of the event, the deed will take effect
from the time of its first delivery, by relation, in order to prevent a failure of
justice: Jackson dem. Russell v. Rowland, supra. In this case, such relation back was denied, where the object was to avoid an intervening judgment: Latham v. Udell (1878), 38
Mich. 238; Welborn v. Weaver, supra;
see Graham v. Graham (1791), 1 Yes.
Jr. 272; Hill v. Hill, 119 Ill. 242. The
condition may be performed after
death: Lindley v. Groff (1887), 37
Minn. 338. Bitt, if the grantor retained any control over the deed, so
as to prevent its being a strict escrow,
no title will pass, for lack of delivery
during the grantor's life: Ball v.
Foresman (1881), 37 Ohio St. 132;
Cook v. Brown (1857), 34 N. H. 460;
P-ntsman v. Baker, supra; Citizens'
Nat. Bank v. Dayton (1886), 116 Ill.
257. So, no title will pass if the Act
to be performed was not to be completed until after the death of the
grantor: Taft v. Taft (1886), 59
Mich. 185; Stone v. French, 37 Kan.
145. But there is a line of cases which
hold that, if the grantor execute the
deed and deliver it to a third person to
deliver it to the grantee, after his (the
grantor's) death, it is a good deed, and
the title passes only upon the second
delivery, vesting, by relation, as of the
time when the deed was left for delivery
with such third person. But it will
be observed that these are instances
where the grantor has parted with his
control over the deed: Hathaway v.
Payne, supra;Prutsmanv. Baker, supra;
Cook v. Brown, supra. While a deed
was in escrow, the grantor died, and
his heirs gave a deed to the grantee,
who paid the purchase-money to the
administrator. It was held that he

held it as an individual for the heirs,
and not as administrator: Teneick v.
"Flagg(1860), 29 N. J. L. 25.
§ 19. Intention of parties that titles
should pass.-If it is the intention of
the parties that the title, after the
performance of the condition, should
date from the first delivery, it will be
so considered: Price v. Pittsburgh, etc.
R. R. Co., supra.
§ 20. Performance.-Tbe condition
to be performed must be one that the
grantee is to perform, and not the
grantor, to make it an escrow; for if
it was to be performed by the grantor,
the deed would be within his control,
and not an escrow: White v. Williams, supra. So the grantee is not
entitled to the deed until he has
complied with the terms of the contract; "a strict compliance with the
terms of the agreement" on his part
must be made: Dyson v. Bradshaw
(1863), 23 Cal. 528; Beern v. 31cKusick
(1858), 10 Id. 538; Demesneyv. Groveln (1870), 56 Ill. 93; Skinnerv. Baker
(1875), 79 Id. 496: Eichlorv. Holroyd,
15 Bradw. (Ill.) 657. The condition
must be literally fulfilled: Humnnon v.
Booth (1839), 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 267 ;
Abbott v. Alsdorf (1869), 19 Mich. 157.
"Until the condition is performed, the
deed is of no more force than it would
have been if the grantor, after signing
and sealing the instrument, had deposited it in his own desk :" Smith
v. South Royalton Bank (1859), 32 Vt.
341. The grantee is bound to perform
the condition, or respond in damages:
Hicks v. Goode, supra.
§ 21. Grantee obtaining possession of
deed wrongfully.-If the grantee obtain
possession before performance, or the
happening of the event, without the
consent of the grantor, even with the
consent of the depositary, he gets no
title to the instrument, nor to the
land conveyed: Harkreaderv. Clayton
(1879), 56 Miss. 383; Patrick v. Mc-
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Cormick, supra; Bailey v. Crim, supra;
Wheelwright v. Weelwright, supra.
Such a deed will be declared void at
the suit of the grantor: Abbott v. Als-1
doiy, sulwa.
The grantor is not estopped from
setting up its invalidity by the fact
that he had acted upon the belief that
the condition had been complied with
before delivery: Robbins v. Magee
(18bl), 7U Ind. 381.
§ 22. Bona fide purchasers.-There is
some little conflict in the decisions,
whether a bona fide purchaser from a
grantee who has wrongfully obtained
possession of the deed from the depositary, will be protected or not. There is a
strong line of authorities which hold
that such a purchaser gets no title:
Cotton v. Gregory (1880), 10 Neb. 125 ;
s.c. 19 AmERICAN LAw REGISTER, 694;
White v. Core (1882), 20 W. Va. 272;
Blackv. Shrere (1860), 13 N. J. Eq. 455.
"Cortnel, the third person in whose
hands it was placed as an escrow, did
not, in fact, deliver it as a deed. And he
had no power to do so, had he attempted to make such delivery, the
event not having transpired upon
which he was authorized to make it.
No delivery having been made then,
the deed was never executed to the
railroad; for delivery is a material
part of the execution of a written instrument; and, the deed not having
been executed, no title passed, for
title to lands is conveyed by executed
deeds :" Perry v. Anderson (1864), 22
Ind. 36. "The deed not having been
delivered, it was a nullity and void,
or, more properly speaking, never executed, and must be tainted with the
fraud of Rolfe, which goes to the very
existence of the instrument, into
whosesoever hands they may come.
It is not like the cases where the fraud
is collateral, as where the instrument
has become a perfect one, and it is
appropriated fraudulently to a use

different from the one for which it
was created:" Smith v. Bank of
South Royalton, supra; Ecerts v.
Agne5 (1855), 4 Wis. 343; Crocker v.
Bellarger (1858), 6 Id. 645; Peter v.
Wright (1855), 6 Ind. 183; Fiaser v.
Davie (1878), 11 S. C. 56; Illinois
Cent., etc. R. R. Co. v. McCullough
166; Cagger v. Lansing
(1871), 59 111.
(1870), 57 Barb. (N.Y.) 421 ; People v.
Bostwick (1865), 35 N. Y. 450; County
of Calhoun v. American Emigrant
Co., supra; Abbott v. Alsdorf, supra;
State Bank v. Evans (1835), 15 N. J.
L. 155; Roberts v. Afullenix (1872), 10
Kan. 22; Boyle v. Boyle (1879), 6 Mo.
App. 594; Chicago, etc. Land Co. v.
Peck (1885), 112 Ill. 408, 447; Chipman v. Tucker, supra. But the grantor
cannot insist upon recognizing the
grantee's possession of the instrument
as valid for some purposes, and disclaim it as nugatory for all others, especially when to do so would be an
injury to an innocent party: Cotton
v. Gregory, supra. See, generally,
Harkreaderv. Clayton, supra, Ogden v.
Ogden (1854), 4 Ohio St. 182.
But where the grantor placed the
grantee in possession, it was held, while
fully acknowledging the rule as above
stated, that the purchaser from the
grantee obtained a good title inequity
upon the ground that the grantor had
been negligent, and upon the further
ground, that where one of two innocent parties must suffer, "he must be
the sufferer who put it in the power
of the wrongdoer to cause the loss ;"
or "where one of two innocent parties must suffer, he through whose
agency the loss occurred must sustain
it:" Quick v. Milligan (1886), 108
Ind. 419 ; Bailey v. Crim, supra. The
general rule has been denied: Blight
v. Schenck (1849), 10 Pa. 285.
§ 23. Proofof Condition.-" The condition upon which a deed is delivered
in escrow may be expressed in writing

CHERRY v. HERRING.
or rest in parol. The rule that an instrument or contract made in writing
interpartes,must be deemed to contain
the entire engagement or understanding, has no application: Stantonv. Aliller(1874), 58 N.Y.192. Of course parol
evidence is admissible to prove a condition resting in parol : Mladison, etc.
Plank Road Co. v. Stevens, supra. See
Foy v. .Blackstone (1863), 31 Ill. 538;
Brown v. Gilman (1819), 4 Wheat.
255 ; Koons v. Ferguson (1865), 25 Ind.
388; Freeland v. Charnley (1881), 80
Ind. 132 ; Campbell v. Thomas, supra.
§ 24. Statute of Frauds.-"Where a
promise is so far executed that a deed
is delivered under it conditionally, it
is taken out of the Statute of Frauds
when the condition is fully performed,
for, upon the performance of the condition, the deed becomes effective and
the grantee is entitled to it:" lfcCasland v. Etna Life Ins. Co. (1886), 108
Ind. 130. "But we have not discovered a single case in which it has
been held, that one who has deposited
a deed of land with a third person,
with directions to deliver it to the
grantee on the happening of a given
event, but who has made no valid
executory contract to convey the land,
may not revoke the directions to the
depositary and recall the deed at any
time before the conditions of the de-

posit have been complied with; provided those conditions are such that
the title does not pass at once to the
grantee upon delivery of the deed to
the depositary :" Campbell v. Thomas,
supra, doubting Thomas v. Sowards
(1870), 25 Wis. 631. So, it is held
that a parol contract of sale of lands
cannot be enforced simply from the fact
that a deed for them was placed in escrow; that an escrow is notTsufficient
to take the sale out of the Statute of
Frauds: Freeland v. Charnley, supra;
disapproving 3 Wash. on Real Prop.
303, and Caggerv. Lansing, .vqra,overruled in Cagger v. Lansing (1871), 43

N. Y. 550. To same effect, Reed on
Statute of Frauds, § 388; Redding v.
Wilkes (1791), 3 Bro. Ch. 400; Bissell v. Farmers'Bank(1853), 5 McLean,
495 ; Sanborn v. Sanborn (1856), 7 Gray
(Mass.), 142; Unhderwood v. Campbell
(1843), 14 N. H. 393; Weir v. BatdotI, Patterson v. Underwood (1868),
Instruments deliv29 Ind. 607.
ered to another on condition that
other parties are to sign them before
they are binding, are not delivered in
escrow; they are incomplete instruments, and the doctrine of escrow is
not strictly applicable to them: Berry
v. Anderson, supra.
W. W. THnoaRON.
Crawfordsville, Ind.

Supreme Court of Texas.
KASLING ET AL. v. MORRIS.
An offer to pay a reward for the detection of a criminal, is binding upon the
private citizen making it, when acted upon.
It is not part of the official duty of a constable, who has not seen the commission of an offence, and has not any information as to the criminal, and has
no warrant, to search a man (casually met on the road) upon mere suspicion.
APPEAL

from the District Court of Cass County.

On the 10th day of March, 1886, at night, the storehouse
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of appellee, R. A. Morris, in the town of Linden, Cass County,
Texas, was broken into, and robbed of about $175 in money.
Early next morning, and immediately upon the discovery of
the burglary, Morris publicly, and many times, offered a reward of $1000 for the arrest and conviction of the thief or
thieves. Plaintiff, E. S. Kasling, was the constable of the
town and precinct where the burglary was committed, and
plaintiff Simmons was a private citizen, who had, on some
occasions, acted in an official capacity as deputy-sheriff.
Among others, Morris told Kasling he would give $1000 for
the arrest and conviction of the party committing the burglary, and Kasling informed Simmons of the reward offered,
and requested him to go with him in search of the thief.
Rand, Taylor, and other parties also mounted horses, and
went in different directions to try to find the burglar or burglars; the hope of the reward being the immediate inducement. Kasling and Simmons mounted horses, and rode some
miles into the country in search of the burglar or burglars, and,
on their return, saw a man on foot, near the road, whom they
accosted, and finally informed that they must search him.
They were ready with their pistols, and, fortunately, "got
the drop on him," or, doubtless, one or both of them would
have been shot; for, on forcing him to hold up his hands,
they found two pistols on different portions of his person, to
one of which he had motioned his hand, and also conclusive
proof that he was a burglar, besides the whole of the stolen
money, and a pistol that had been stolen on the night of the
house burglary from another store in Linden which had also
been broken into. They arrested him without warrant or affidavit, and took him at once to Linden, and lodged him in
jail. Kasling then made the necessary affidavit, and procured
a warrant, and, on the trial, the prisoner waived an examination, and was committed by the magistrate to answer the
charge of the burglary of Morris' store and safe. At the ensuing term of the District Court, held in and for Cass County,
Texas, the prisoner, James Sanders, was duly indicted for the
burglary and theft in Morris' store, and for other felonies
committed the same night, and was tried and convicted, E. S.
Kasling being present, and testifying on behalf of the State.
VOL. XXXVIL--8
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Morris disobeyed the process of the State and left the county
to avoid testifying against him. Sanders was duly convicted of
said offence and consigned to the penitentiary. After the
conviction of Sanders, appellants went to Morris and demanded the $1000 reward. Morris at first evaded, and asked
delay and time to see his attorney, and finally refused to

pay; whereupon appellants brought this suit, which was
submitted to the Court, without a jury, on the above facts,
and was decided against appellants and in favor of Morris,
both on the law and the facts; and appellants have taken this
appeal.
B. S. Eberhardtand Todd &Rowell, for appellants.
WALKER, J.
Oct. 26, 1888. The ibregoing statement,
adopted from the brief of the appellants, presents a fair and
reasonably full statement of the case shown in the record. The
statement of facts shows that Morris offered the reward as
alleged. The offer was public, and repeatedly made, and in
several instances was accompanied by special request to parties
to act upon it, and to engage in the search for the guilty party.
In one or more instances, he was asked if he was serious in
making it, and replied that he was, and had the money to pay
it. Unquestionably such an offer, when and after it has been
acted upon, becomes binding upon the party making it: Btayden v. Souger (1877), 56 Ind. 42.
It is not disputed that Kasling and Simmons acted upon the
offer, and arrested Sanders, who was subsequently convicted
for the offence of burglary in breaking open and stealing from
Morris' storehouse. Morris, the defendant, testified to his
suspicions, which he told to others, that the burglary was
another "Keating affair" (meaning that he thought it had
been committed by persons residing in the neighborhood),
and that he had named one as suspected, and that he thought
three or more persons had been engaged in the crime, and
substantially, that his motive for making the offer was to
rid the neighborhood of dangerous criminals. However true
his testimony may have been, the testimony of many witnesses supports the allegation in the petition, and that those
motives in fact form no part of his public offer. That offhr
did not restrict the reward, so that it was to be given upon
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the detection, arrest and conviction of the village blacksmith
and his supposed associates, as the guilty parties. Nor would
Kasling's knowledge of the motives inducing to the offer, or
the direction of Morris' suspicions, of itself alter the terms of
the public offer, or prevent Kasling from acting upon it. Of
course, if, in the private conference between Morris and Kasling, the latter was informed that the offer was restricted, it
would, to that extent, require notice by Kasling. It is noted,
however, that Kasling distinctly denies the statement made
by Morris as to the conversation between them before the
arrest. What passed in that conversation is a question of
veracity between the two interested parties.
Nor were the plaintiffs disqualified from earning and exacting the reward under the offer, by reason of the fact that
Kasling was constable of the beat in which the arrest of Sanders was made. Kasling requested Simmons to arm himself
and join in the search, assuring him of the offered reward.
It appears that the arrest was made several miles from the
county-seat, and was made without warrant. Kasling had not
seen the offence committed, nor had he any information that
Sanders was the guilty party, other than his own suspicions
when they met on the road. The act was not required by his
official duty. It is well recognized that an officer is not entitled to reward beyond his legal fees for the performance of an
act which it is his official duty to perform. The employment
and payment for extra-official work, though incident to his
official duty, is not against public policy. Detective work is
usually directed to the task of hunting up the perpetrator of
some offence, where the ordinary machinery of the Courts
*needs such aid. This work is only incidental to the official
duty of the constable or sheriff: Rev. Stat. Tex. Art. 4537;
Code Crim. Proc. Tex. Arts. 44, 45; Add. Cont. § 18. The
testimony shows that the offer was made, and its terms met,
by a great preponderance in the testimony; so great that
judgment should be reversed.
Reversed and remanded.
In his Principles of Contract
(4th ed. 3-12), Mr. Pollock quotes
with approbation section eight of the

Indian Contract Act: "Performance
of the conditions of a proposal or the
acceptance of any consideration for a
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reciprocal promise which may be of- person who performed the condition
fered with a proposal, is an acceptance mentioned in the advertisement, as
savoring of the notion that there is
of the proposal ;" and says, "this
an inchoate or unascertained obligarule contains the true legal theory of
offers of reward made by public ad- tion from the publishing of the offer,
vertisement for the procuring of in- and adds: "If such were indeed the
formation, the restoration of lost prop- ratio decidendi, we need not hesitate to
say that at the present day it cannot
erty, and the like."
In the discussion of this subject, be maintained:" Pollock on Conthe learned author says that a diffi- tracts (4th ed.), 20.
These cases differ from those in
culty is raised by the suggestion, in
which services, such as are usually
certain cases, that the first offer or
announcement is not a mere proposal, paid for, are performed for the defendant's benefit, with his approbation,
but constitutes a kind of anomalous
floating contract with the unascer- express or implied, and in which a
tained person who shall fulfil the promise to pay may be implied and
prescribed condition. He adds: "A
recovery allowed, on the footing of a
vinculum juris, with one end loose, is, quantum meruit. In the other cases,
on principle, an inadmissible concep- where the obligation rests purely
tion, to say nothing of the inconveni- upon express contract, the question
ence which would come from treating presented is whether performance of
the offer as an irrevocable promise :" the terms of the offer, without knowledge of the proposal, will constitute a
Pollock on Contracts (4th ed.), 19.
Among the cases cited as counte- contract. I
Mr. Pollock's dissent from the afnancing this doctrine was Wrilloims v.
firmative of this proposition is supCarwardine (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 621.
ported by the decisions of the AmeriThat case was stated as follows: A
reward had been offered by the de- can Courts.
In Ball v. Newton (1851), 7 Cush.
fendant for information which should
lead to the discovery of a murderer. A (Mass.) 599, the action was brought
statement which had that effect, was on a written promise by a third person
made by the plaintiff, but not to the to pay certain fees in the case of an
defendant, nor with a view to obtain- insolvent debtor, provided they were
ing the reward, nor, for aught that not otherwise paid. After the paper
appeared, with any knowledge that a was signed, the plaintiff was chosen
reward had been offered. The Court assignee in insolvency. The agreeheld that the plaintiff had a good ment was delivered to the insolvent,
cause of action. In commenting on retained and not delivered to the
this decision, the learned author says plaintiff until the proceedings in inthat it sets up a contract without any solvency were concluded. At the
animus contrahendi, and that if it be trial, he offered to prove that he had
now law (which he doubts), it goes performed the duties of assignee; that
to show that in these cases there may his services were reasonably worth a
be an acceptance constituting a con- certain sum; that he had received
tract, without any communication of nothing therefor; and that no propthe proposer to the acceptor, or of the erty had come to his hands out of
acceptance to the proposer. He.also which he could pay himself. The
criticises the statement of PARKS, J., Judge ruled, that upon the facts in
that there was a contract with any evidence and those offered to be
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proved, the plaintiff could not maintain his action. On exceptions to this
ruling, the Court held that the paper
was not of itself a contract, that there
were no sufficient parties to make a
contract, there being no promisee;
that if the paper had been shown
to the plaintiff, and he had accepted it, and had become assignee
and performed the services upon
the strength of it, that might have
formed a contract; but that it did
not appear that the plaintiff ever
saw or heard of the paper until after
he had discharged the duties of assignee, nor did it appear that he
accepted the paper, or performed
any services upon the strength of it,
or in reliance upon it, or did any
thing whatever to create a good consideration and make a contract between him and the defemdant. The
principle on which this case was
decided had in prior cases been
recognized in the same Court: Wentworth v. Day (1841), 3 Met. (Mass.)
352; Lering v. City of Boston (1844),
7Id. 409.
In Fitch v. Snedaker (1868), 38 N.
Y. 248, the defendant offered a reward
for information which should lead to
the apprehension and conviction of the
person guilty of a murder. Before
the plaintiff had seen or heard of the
offer, one F. was arrested, tried, and
convicted of the murder. The plaintiffs brought an action to recover the
reward. On the trial they proved
the publication of the notice, and then
offered to prove that before the notice
was known to them they gave information which led to the arrest of F.
This evidence was excluded. This
ruling was sustained by the Court of
Appeals. WOODRUFF, J., in delivering
the opinion, said, "The question in
this case is simple. A murderer having been arrested and imprisoned in
consequence of information given by

the plaintiffs, before they are aware
that a reward is offered for such apprehension, are they entitled to claim
the reward in case conviction follows ?
* ** I perceive, however, no reason
for applying to an offer of reward for
the apprehension of a criminal, any
other rules than are applicable to any
other offer by one, accepted or acted
upon by another, and so relied upon
as constituting a contract. * * * To
the existence of a contract there must
be mutual assent, or, in another form,
offer and consent to the offer. The
motive inducing consent may be immaterial, but the consent is vital. Without that there is no contract. How
then can there be consent or assent to
that of which the party has never
heard ?" This case was cited and followed in Howland v. Lounds (1873),
51 N. Y. 604, where it was held that
a party returning stolen property
without knowledge of the offered reward could not recover.
City Bank v. Bangs (1833), 2
Ewd. Ch. (N. Y.), 95, was an interpleader between claimants for a
reward for the recovery of stolen
property. The Vice-Chancellor adopted as a rule of decision, that to entitle a person to a reward, the acts
done by way of performance must be
done with a view to the acceptance
and performance of the contract tendered by the offer, in the expectation
of earning the reward if the effort is
crowned with success. A similar
ruling was approved in Lee v. Trustees, etc. (1838), 7 Dana (Ky.), 28;
and Stamper v. Temple (1845), 6
Humph. (Tenn.), 113.
In 21ayor, etc. of Hoboken v. Bailey
(1873), 36 N. J. L. 490, the county
of H. had offered a bounty for volunteers. The city of Hoboken, which
was in the county, by resolution of
the common council, offered an additional bounty to volunteers who should
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be credited to the city. The plaintiff
was recruited by an agent of the
county, paid the county bounty and
credited to a ward in the city. He
sued the city for the additional
bounty. It did not appear that the
plaintiff knew that any bounty was
offered by the city. Error was assigned to the judge's charge that the
jury should find a verdict for the
plaintiff, on the ground that there
was no evidence of a contract by the
city to pay the plaintiff the bounty,
or of any consideration to support a
recovery. The Court in the opinion,
reversing the judgment for error in
the charge, said: "The city was under no obligation to answer the demand which had been made under
the conscription law upon its citizens
who were liable to draft. The Act of
the Legislature under the authority
of which the resolution was passed,
gave the corporate authorities power
to use the funds of the city to supply
volunteers, but did not enjoin it upon
them as a duty. The benefit accruing from the relief of citizens from a
draft was to individuals. Whatever
aid was extended by the city towards
the accomplishment of that end was
purely gratuitous. * * * * The con-

sideration for an undertaking of this
kind is not the rendition of services
beneficial to the promisor. In this
respect the resolution of the common
council is analogous to the offer of a
reward for the apprehension of the
perpetrator of a crime. * * * * Upon

what principle does the right of recovery in such case rest ? It cannot
be maintained on the proposal of a
reward, or bounty, for no contract
will be concluded by a mere offer; nor
will it result from the fact of performance, for an interest in the subject
to which the offer relates is not essen.
tial to the validity of the contract,
where the service is performed. The

foundation of the right of action is
the contract concluded between the
parties, by the proposition by the one
side, and its acceptance by the other,
supported by the consideration which
results from the performance of the
stipulated service, on the faith of
the promise contained in the offer.
* * * * The right of action in such
cases being founded in contract, for
which no precedent consideration was
paid, and in which no promises is
named, it would follow as a necessary
result, that in order to complete the
contract and give it mutuality, an assent in some way to the terms of the
offer must be given. It is also equally
clear that, where the service in itself
is not benefidial" to the promisor, it
can be made available as the consideration of a contract, only where
the person performing it was induced
to do so by a request, express or implied, on the part of the promisor.
* * **
There cannot be any assent
or agreement to an offer of which the
party has no knowledge. The proposal of a reward which was not within
the knowledge of the person who happens, or from other considerations is
induced, to perform the act designated
as the condition on which the reward
is payable, cannot by any rule of law
or process of reasoning, be construed
to be a precedent request, or to have
operated as an inducement to do an
act which is done in entire ignorance
of the offer." The Court referred to
Williams v. Carwardine, infra, and observed that as the case in banc was reported, it did not appear that the plaintiff acted without knowledge of the offer
of a reward, and that in the report of
the trial at nisi prius, it was manifest
from the circumstances in evidence and
the argument of counsel that the plaintiff's knowledge of the handbill was
not disputed.
Referring to the case of Williams v.
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Carwardine (1833), reported in 5 C. &
P. 566, it is apparent from what took
place at the trial, that the only controversy was, whether the plaintiff,
acting from motives of revenge and
not for the sake of the reward, came
within the conditions of the handbill.
The same reporters add a note of the
case in banc, in which Curwood, in response to the question by Lord Chiet
Justice DnazAx, if 4ny doubt had been
suggested, whether the plaintiff knew
of the handbill at the time of making
the disclosure, said that she musthave
known it, as it was placarded all over
Hereford, the place where she lived.
Mr. Justice LIUTLEDALE added, that,
if the person knew of the handbill
and did the thing, that was quite
enough. These expressions indicate
that the learned justices inferred
knowledge on the part of the plaintiff
from the public nature of the notice,
and the absence of testimony to the
contrary. It is not to be supposed
that the Court would have disregarded
the principle laid down in the leading
case of Lampleigh v. Braithwait (160325), Hob. 105, without some reference
to that case. That was an action to
recover a reward for procuring the
King's pardon. The defence was the
absence of sufficient consideration. It
was agreed that a mere voluntary
courtesy would not have a consideration to uphold an assumpsit, "but,"
said the Court, "if that courtesy were
moved by a suit or request of the
party that gives the assumpsit, it will
bind; for the promise, though it follows, yet it is not naked, but couples
itself with the suit before, and the
merits of the party procured by that
suit, which is the difference." And
it appearing that the defendant had
personally requested the plaintiff's
endeavor, and that he had made his
endeavor according to the request, the
plaintiff had judgment.

Reasoning similar to that in 31ayor,
etc. of Ebboken v. Bailey, supra, has
been applied by other Courts in the
disposition of claims by volunteers to
bounties offered by public authorities:
State v. Brown (1866), 20 Wis. 287;
Frey v. Fon du Lac (1869), 24 Id. 204;
Larimner v. McLean County (1868), 47
I1. 36; 3forgan v. Chester County
(1867), 56 Pa. 466; Brecknock Scbo~l
Districtv. Frankhauser (1868), 58 Id.
380.
Brecknock- School Dist. v. Frankhauser was an action brought to recover a bounty, under an Act of the
Pennsylvania Legislature. The evidence at the trial showed the plaintiff's enlistment, and his being
credited to the quota of Brecknock
Township. The Court, in reversing
judgment for the plaintiff below, said:
"The veteran must show that he enlisted under the offer, before a contract can be implied to pay him a
bounty. * * * His credit to the township was an act of the government
merely, in the distribution of the demands for military service, and
created of itself no duty, perfect or
imperfect, to pay him a bounty without an accepted offer."
In afew cases, knowledge of the proposal before performance of its terms
has been held immaterial. Some of
these decisions were founded upon
unsatisfactory interpretations of Williams v. Carwardine,supra, and without
further reasoning ; Russell v. Stewart
(1872), 44 Vt. 170, and Burke v. Wells,
Fargo6- Co. (1875), 50 Cal. 218. Others
allowed recovery on grounds of public
policy, independent of contract relations : Dawkins v. Sappington (1866),
26 Ind. 199 ; Auditor, etc. v. Ballard
(1873), 9 Bush (Ky.), 572.
The weight of authority and the
force of reasoning in the American
Courts strongly support Mr. Pollock's
protest against the inference of a con-

